Representation in Hybrid Regimes: Constituency and Party Influences on Legislative Voting in the Russian Duma 1996–1999*

Tanya Bagashka, University of Houston

Objectives. The objectives of the study were to establish whether district ideology was reflected in legislator ideal points in the 1996–1999 Duma. Methods. I integrate for the first time individual-level survey data on citizen attitudes to economic reform, the major dimension of political conflict in Russia in the 1990s, with individual legislator voting records from the 1996 to 1999 Duma. Using a Bayesian method, I estimate legislator ideal points as a function of individual and district characteristics and an individually specific random shock to assess the direct effect of district ideology and party membership. Results. According to my results, legislators were responsive to district preferences on salient legislation such as final passage votes and key votes. Conclusions. The findings have implications for the effects of a mixed electoral system, which was introduced in many young democracies in Eastern Europe and Latin America. The broader conclusion of the study is that the electoral incentives in the single-member district component of the election can encourage legislative responsiveness even in a “partial” democracy such as Russia.

Whether constituency preferences are reflected in legislative roll call voting is a central question in assessing the consolidation of democracy or lack thereof in newly democratized countries. Institutions that allow for sanctioning legislators unresponsive to the demands of their constituents are the essence of democracy. Strengthening the legislator-constituent linkage was especially important for democratic consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe, where after the fall of communism, “parliaments served as both symbols and institutional expressions of political change” (Judge and Ilonski, 1995:161). In a period of simultaneous political and economic transition, in the absence of strong and cohesive parties and underdeveloped organized interests, the development of legislative responsiveness was a crucial step in securing popular support for the young reformist elites.

I integrate for the first time individual-level data on citizen preferences about economic reform, the major dimension of political conflict in Russia.

*Direct correspondence to Tanya Bagashka, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Houston, 447 Philip Guthrie Hoffman Hall, Houston, TX 77204-3011 (tbagashka@uh.edu). Tanya Bagashka will share all data and coding for replication purposes.

SOCIAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, Volume 95, Number 2, June 2014
© 2013 by the Southwestern Social Science Association
DOI: 10.1111/ssqu.12031
in the 1990s, with individual legislator voting records to investigate whether the single-member district (SMD) legislators in the 1996–1999 Duma were responsive to the ideological preferences of their constituents. I find that constituency preferences were reflected in roll call voting on votes district voters were more likely to monitor, such as final passage and key votes. The findings have relevance for the consequences of the mixed electoral system, different versions of which were introduced in many young democracies. Members of the working group that crafted the Russian electoral law advocated the adoption of a mixed system as “the best of both worlds” (Shugart and Wattenberg, 2001), a system that would encourage local representation and at the same time provide an impetus to the development of strong parties through the national proportional representation (PR) component (Remington, 1996). While similar normative arguments were espoused by political reformers in other new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe and in Latin America (Carey, 2003) the effect of the mixed system on ideological responsiveness has received little scholarly attention, despite its importance.

The Russian 1996–1999 Duma: Institutional Incentives

The extent to which district policy ideological preferences are reflected in legislative voting has attracted significant attention in the U.S. context (see, for example, Miller and Stokes, 1963; Clinton, 2006; Erikson, 1978). The large literature on the electoral connection in the United States has investigated the effect of personalist electoral rules on legislative behavior more generally. This literature has generally concluded that candidate-centered electoral rules such as SMDs motivate legislators to provide particularized benefits to secure votes (Mayhew, 1974; Fenno, 1978; Parker, 1986; Fiorina, 1997). The comparative politics literature has similarly emphasized the importance of electoral rules for legislators’ responsiveness to party leaders versus responsiveness to alternative interests in the electorate. In systems where nominations are controlled by party leaders and where voters cannot rank candidates, candidates tend to focus on enhancing the reputation of their party. By contrast, where voters can express a preference among candidates from the same party, candidates tend to satisfy local demands in order to enhance their personal reputations and reelection prospects (see, for example, Ames, 1998; Golden and Chang, 1998; Huber, 1994; Lijphart, 1984; Powell, 1989, 2000; Shugart, 2001).

I revisit the question of legislative responsiveness to the policy preferences of local constituents in the context of the 1996–1999 Duma. In the 1993–2003 period, the Russian lower house of the legislature, the Duma, was elected by two different electoral rules and was characterized by two distinct kinds

---

1Certainly, we cannot determine how important these normative arguments were for President Yeltsin and his close advisors (Remington, 1996).
of representation (geographical constituency and party). Half of the MPs in the 450-member Duma were elected in SMDs and the remaining 225 from national party lists of the parties that cleared the 5 percent electoral threshold. In all Duma elections from 1993 to 2003, Russian voters had two votes: one for a national party list and another for a representative in a SMD. To compete in SMDs, candidates could either meet the signature requirement, equal to 1 percent of the number of registered voters in her district, or compete as candidates of a political party that was eligible to compete in the PR component of the election.\(^2\) Unlike the German or the Hungarian mixed system, the results from the two tiers of the mixed system were not linked. These institutional incentives should lead us to expect differences in the voting behavior of the PR and the SMD deputies.

The Russia-specific literature has investigated legislative responsiveness to local interests in the electorate. In previous studies of the Duma, most of which focus on the 1990s, when Russia employed a mixed electoral system, the evidence of constituency effects on legislative voting in the Duma is indirect. The focus is on whether there are differences in party loyalty between deputies elected under SMD rules and those elected under PR; weaker party loyalty of the SMD deputies is interpreted as an effort to satisfy local interests to ensure reelection. The empirical evidence on differences in party loyalty between PR and SMD deputies is mixed. Remington and Smith (1995) and Haspel, Remington, and Smith (1998) do not find a significant difference in party discipline divide within legislative parties in the 1994–1995 Duma. Remington and Smith (2001) find significant PR/SMD divides in the 1994–1995 Duma only on some issues, namely, those concerned with the rights and roles of factions themselves. Thames (2001b) finds evidence of a PR/SMD divide in the 1994–1999 period in all issue areas and in budgetary policy, even when controlling for party membership. Kunicova and Remington (2008) show that in the 1995–1999 and the 1999–2003 Dumas, SMD deputies were more likely to deviate from the party line on votes on budgetary policy than the party list deputies.

Closest to my analysis, in a study of legislative voting behavior in the 1993–1995 Duma, Thames studies the association between a measure of district ideology based on factor analysis of the district percentage vote share of the parties competing in the national PR tier and a measure of deputy ideology based on factor analysis of roll call data. He finds significant association between district and individual deputy ideology. Thames (2002) investigates the relationship between the percentage vote share of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and the percentage of times each SMD deputy

\(^2\)In 2005, electoral reforms proposed by President Putin eliminated the SMD seats at the expense of the PR, or party list seats. Thus, all 450 seats were filled on the basis of party lists competing in the all-Russian federal electoral district. The reforms also raised the electoral threshold to 7 percent. The new system became effective in the 2007 election. In order to participate in the nationwide PR election, political parties were required to collect a sufficient number of signatures from registered voters.
voted with the majority of the Communist Party on contested votes in the Duma between 1994 and 1998. Using this measure, Thames (2002) finds that stronger district support for the Communist Party was associated with greater likelihood to vote with the majority of the Communist Party on contested votes.3

**Legislative Responsiveness in Mixed Electoral Systems**

The effect of electoral mandate on legislator responsiveness to local constituency has been addressed in the more recent literature on mixed electoral systems. While different works have reached contradictory conclusions, most have found some indication of responsiveness to local constituencies on the part of the deputies elected in SMDs. Many studies have focused on differences in attitudes, bill initiation, and committee membership between deputies elected under different electoral rules. Based on survey data from German legislators, Lancaster and Patterson (1995) show that SMD deputies considered delivering pork-barrel projects more important for reelection as compared to legislators elected in multimember districts. Strattman and Baur (2002) investigate the distribution of committees in the German Bundestag and find significant differences in committee membership between legislators elected in SMDs and those elected in multimember districts. SMD legislators were members of committees that allowed them to serve their geographic constituencies, while PR legislators were members of committees that service the party constituencies, which were not necessarily party based. Another survey-based survey by Scholl (1986) found that British members of the European Parliament elected in SMDs were more interested in constituency service than were French members, who were elected in PR elections. In a study of postcommunist Hungary, Montgomery (1999) found that electoral mandate was associated with differences in the way representatives used office resources, introduced inquiries, and proposed bills on the floor.

A study of the Russian Duma in this particular period has unique advantages. Analysis of the effects of mixed electoral rules on representation in a young democracy like Russia in the 1990s would establish whether legislators elected in a given tier of the mixed system would behave as the members elected in a “pure system” of one tier alone, as a number of scholars presumed (see Jessee, 1988; Shugart and Wattenberg, 2001; Massicotte and Blais, 1999). The expectation that legislators in the different tiers of the mixed system would behave as legislators in the “pure” systems was also a premise of the arguments

3In a related analysis of party discipline in the Ukrainian Rada, Herron (2002) detected no significant differences between PR and SMD legislators in the Ukrainian Rada. In a cross-national study of legislative voting in Hungary, Russia, and Ukraine, Thames (2005) identifies electoral mandate divisions only in Russia, the country with the most weakly institutionalized party system.
of institutional reformers who advocated the adoption of the mixed electoral system in many young democracies in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Electoral engineers frustrated with the tradeoff between one form of representation and another advocated the adoption of mixed electoral systems as the “best of both worlds,” a system that would encourage legislators to balance party and individual accountability. The combination of majoritarian and PR rules in mixed systems would promote party formation in new democracies, at the same time encouraging both national and local representation. According to the opposing view, party and individual legislator electoral strategies prevent legislators from behaving as if they were elected in a “pure” system made up of one tier alone due to interaction effects between the two tiers of the mixed system. Whether and under what conditions strategic incentives in the mixed system override the conventional effects of electoral systems is still an empirical question (see Crisp, 2007). As Moser and Scheiner argue, mixed electoral systems can be treated as a social laboratory, where conventional relationships are identified, especially when interaction effects work against finding such results.

Legislative Responsiveness in Hybrid Regimes

The legislator-constituency relationship in Russia has broader implications for legislative accountability in hybrid regimes (intermediate states between democracy and autocracy). Russia’s political system, often portrayed as “partially democratic” or “competitive authoritarian” (Diamond, 2002; Levitsky and Way, 2002; Diamond and Plattner, 2002; Ottaway, 2003) does not lead one to expect strong legislative responsiveness. As of 1995 Russia could hardly be called a fully edged democracy. While President Yeltsin was much more tolerant of political opposition than his successor, there were few checks on his power. Still, as of 1995 Russia met most criteria for electoral democracy in that: there was continuity in the rules of the game; electoral rules were universally accepted; the outcome of the elections was uncertain; the federal authorities did not intervene to change the electoral outcome; and the elections were competitive, even though not all competitors were given equal

---

4 A number of studies have questioned the assumption of independence between the SMD and PR tiers of the mixed system. The lack of independence has several sources. One source of dependence is party electoral strategies based on specialization (Ferrara and Herron, 2005; Moser and Scheiner, 2004; Thames, 2001a): parties specialize in one tier of the system and adjust their behavior accordingly. For instance, a party may nominate a SMD candidate in a district where the party has no chance of winning in order to boost its district PR share (Cox and Schoppa, 2002; Herron and Nishikawa, 2001). Similarly, parties emphasizing the nominal tier might encourage PR deputies to provide constituency services in order to win SMD seats in particular areas (Barker et al., 2001). Thus, we might observe entry decisions and constituency service driven not by the interests of individual legislators or the incentives of a single tier, but the overarching interests of the party (Calvo and Medina, 2002; Haspel, Remington, and Smith, 1998).
opportunities (McFaul, Ryabov, and Petrov, 2000:5). While most studies of legislative representation rest on the premise that strong parties are a necessary condition for democratic accountability (Bowler, Farrell, and Katz, 1999; Linz, 1994; Valenzuela, 1994), there is growing evidence that direct legislative responsiveness often leads to frequent breaches of party unity, even in consolidated democracies (Whiteley and Seyd, 1999; Lanfranchi and Luthi, 1999). Furthermore, several empirical studies have identified a cross-national trend toward designing institutions that strengthen individual legislative responsiveness (even at the expense of party unity) that is driven by increasing dissatisfaction with political parties (Barczac, 2001; Scarrow, 2001). A study of the legislator-constituency relationship in the Russian hybrid regime of the 1990s, a regime that fell short of a fully edged democracy but nevertheless met the criteria for electoral democracy (Diamond, 2002; Levitsky and Way, 2002; Diamond and Plattner, 2002; Ottaway, 2003) is an opportunity to understand the bigger question of whether direct legislator-constituency accountability can develop in the absence of an institutionalized party system.

I address more directly the relationship between constituency preferences about economic reform and legislator-induced preferences. Using a statistical model with theoretical foundations in the spatial voting model, I estimate legislators’ ideal points as a function of constituency preferences and party affiliation.

I focus on the 1996–1999 convocation, which is substantively important in its own right: despite the continuing conflict between the government and the Duma dominated by leftist parties, it was one of the most productive convocations in terms of amount of approved innovative and consequential legislation (see Chaisty, 2002). The 1996–1999 Duma is often depicted as the Duma that stymied President Yeltsin’s reform efforts and thus contributed to the economic crash in 1998. After the 1995 parliamentary election, a reformist coalition formed in Yeltsin’s cabinet, but the government was left with only 12 percent of the total seats. Due to the lack of a stable anti-government coalition and the strong prerogatives of the president, Yeltsin was able to govern. However, passing reform legislation was very difficult. The 1996–1999 Duma was often the major cause for the government’s failure to pass important reform initiatives such as an austere budget, a new tax code, and land reform. More broadly, understanding the 1996–1999 Duma can give us insights into the effects of institutions on the process of the Russian simultaneous transition. Should we expect individual deputy responsiveness to constituency demands to matter if most voters do not monitor on a regular basis the deliberations in the Duma? As Remington (2006) notes, parties and SMD deputies in the Duma frequently use individual and party voting records on salient legislation, defending their own voting position and criticizing those of their political rivals. Examination of the electoral campaign literature demonstrates that candidates and parties frequently refer to specific bills. Even though voters might not pay close attention to the daily activities of the Duma, electoral competition brings individual and party voting behavior to
voters’ attention (Remington, 2006). Drawing on previous findings from the comparative and the Russia-specific literature, I expect the desire for reelection to make legislators responsive to their constituency preferences.

**Measuring Constituency Preferences**

To measure district ideology, I use data from the 1995 to 1996 Russian Election Study. Previous studies of voters and political elites have established that support for economic reform was the major ideological dimension in the period under examination (see, for example, Brader and Tucker, 2001; Miller and Klobucar, 2000; Thames, 2005). Similarly, analysis of roll call data from the Duma has established that support for economic reform was the major dimension of political conflict in the Russian Duma (Remington, Smith, and Kiewiet, 1994; Remington and Smith, 1995; Thames, 2004). The survey includes a question on citizens’ support for the transition from a centrally planned to a market economy. Individual rankings of support for economic reform are as close as possible to individual placements on a left-right scale, the standard measure of citizen ideology for the consolidated democracies. A measure based on attitudinal surveys such as the one employed here is a more direct measure of district ideology than measures based on demographic characteristics (Kalt and Zupan, 1984). While demographic characteristics are antecedents of political preferences, they are not necessarily a valid indicator of preferences on a left-right ideological continuum (Levenduysky et al., 2005), unless a particular set of votes is directly related to particular district characteristics being measured, as in Bailey (2001).

---

5 Ideally, I would like to include examples of discussions of the voting behavior of individual SMD deputies. Unfortunately, campaign literature from the SMD contests was harder to obtain. Still, if the voting behavior of political opponents is discussed at the party level, it is plausible that it is also discussed at the individual-deputy level. That SMD deputies highlight their own voting behavior is also evident on their personal websites, where many of them list their legislative initiatives.


7 The exact wording of the question is: “What is your view of the transition to a market economy in Russia? Which of the opinions I shall now read out is closest to your opinion? (3) You are for a market economy and believe that the transition to the market should be quick; (2) You are for a market economy and believe that the transition to a market economy should be gradual; (1) You are against the transition to a market economy.”

8 The validity of the measure is confirmed by the significant difference in the support for economic reform along the urban-rural divide. It is well known that the inhabitants of urban areas were more supportive of economic reform compared to those from rural areas. According to the survey, 27.5 percent of the respondents from big cities state that they were opposed to the transition to market economy. For rural areas, the corresponding percentage is 46.5. Its validity is also evidenced by its consistency with the party affiliation of the SMD deputies. For example, the mean district ideology for districts that elected KPRF deputies is $-0.66$, while that for Yabloko and OHR deputies is $0.33$ and $0.97$, respectively (to facilitate interpretation, mean district ideology is standardized (its mean is zero and standard deviation ($SD$) is one, with larger positive scores indicating pro-reform district ideology).
The measure of district ideology was constructed in the following way. I calculated the mean ideology for a particular party as the average of the individual self-rankings of the respondents who voted for this particular party in the national PR tier of the election (denoted by mean voter position
\text{party } i
 in Equation (1)). Then I weighted the mean ideology for each party at the national level by the district percentage vote share of this party in order to take into account the actual proportion of district voters who voted for this particular party (denoted by vote share
\text{party } i
 in Equation (1)). Thus, the measure of district ideology is the weighted average of the mean voter positions for each party with weights the district percentage vote shares for each party. That is, for district \( i \), pro-reform sentiment or district ideology is:

\[
\text{District preference}_i = \sum_{i}^{N} \text{vote share}_{\text{party } i} \times \text{mean voter position}_{\text{party } i}.
\]

As a robustness check, I constructed a measure based only on the district percentage vote shares of the parties competing in the national PR tier of the election, similar to the one used in Thames’s (2004) study of the 1993–1995 Duma. The pattern of the party vote shares from the PR component at the district level provides us with a measure of district ideology unavailable in many other political systems. A growing body of literature has demonstrated that as of 1995 Russian voters were able to recognize the major political parties and differentiate among their ideological positions (Miller and Klobucar, 2000; Brader and Tucker, 2001; Colton, 2000; Hale, 2006). According to results from multiple surveys, voters’ loyalties to parties were rational and consistent: voters supported parties whose stands were consistent with their beliefs and preferences (Brader and Tucker, 2001; Colton, 2000:154; Miller and Klobucar, 2000). Thus, strong district support for pro-reform parties such as Yabloko or Union of Right Forces as compared to the support for anti-reform (or leftist) parties such as the Communist Party of the Russian

---

9The preparliamentary wave of the 1995–1996 survey questioned a nationally representative sample of 2,841 Russian citizens and the postparliamentary wave of the survey included 2,776 of the original participants. The data set is based on a multistage probability sample of the Russian Federation’s voting population as of December 1995. Ten geographical regions were constructed, each one comprising 29 strata according to the region’s measure of population size, and one primary sampling unit per stratum was chosen randomly using probability proportional to size. Interviews were conducted in 32 of Russia’s 89 administrative units. Within the primary sampling units, the population was further divided into rural and urban substrata, and villages (in the rural areas) or microcensus enumeration districts (in the towns and cities) were selected as second-stage units. Finally, households were randomly selected using the Kish procedure.

10Alternatively, I could have used the average self-ranking of the survey respondents from each individual district as a proxy for district ideology. However, using this approach would be problematic due to district coverage of the survey, small sample size, and representativeness at the district level. This would involve including less than a third of the districts and legislators in the statistical analysis, as 67 districts are included in the survey, and 24 of these have less than 20 respondents per district.
Federation or the Agrarian Party of Russia should signal to representatives that their district is pro-reform oriented.

To construct the second measure of district ideological preferences, a principal component analysis was run on the party vote shares. A dominant dimension accounted for 49 percent of the variance in the district percentage vote shares. The percentage vote shares of right or pro-reform parties such as Yabloko or the Union of Right Forces load high on this dimension, while left or anti-reform parties like the Communist Party of the Russian Federation or the Agrarian Party load low. This dimension is readily interpretable as economic reform. I computed scores for each district using the major dimension loadings. Districts with high level of support for pro-reform parties have high scores, while districts with high level of support for anti-reform or left parties have low scores.\textsuperscript{11} The ordering of Russia’s parties along the identified dominant dimension is very similar to rankings derived from previous research based on survey data (Miller and Klobucar, 2000), as well as deductively derived rankings of the parties based on the way they portray themselves or are describes in the media (Reisinger et al., 1998). The correlation between the two measures of district ideology (see Table 2 in the Online Appendix) is 0.78.\textsuperscript{12}

I estimate the relationship for final passage votes and key votes because voting on final passage votes is more likely to be monitored by constituents compared to votes on amendments, procedural votes, or bills in their first, second, or third reading. While party leaders understand the stronger constituency pressures deputies face on final passage votes and tend to allow occasional defections in order to avoid future electoral losses, they are much less likely to excuse defections on procedural votes.\textsuperscript{13} The connection of procedural issues to actual policy outcomes is usually beyond the understanding of most voters and is thus less likely to be monitored by local constituents (Rohde, 1991; Cox and McCubbins, 1993; Sinclair, 2000).\textsuperscript{14} To identify key votes, I use Chaisty and Schleiter’s (2005) list of important legislation based

\textsuperscript{11}Robustness checks with measures based on the vote shares of all 43 political parties that competed in the list component and also a different definition of “major” parties were done, which demonstrated that while the loadings slightly change, the party rankings are still consistent with their stands on the major reform dimension.

\textsuperscript{12}To facilitate interpretation, mean district ideology is standardized (its mean is zero and SD is one), with larger positive scores indicating pro-reform district ideology.

\textsuperscript{13}In the Duma, bills are considered in three readings. In the first reading, the deputies decide whether to approve the basic conception of the bill. If the bill is approved, it goes back to the committee, which considers amendments by deputies. If the bill is not approved, it is taken out of consideration. When the bill is presented to the floor for the second reading, the chamber decides which amendments to accept. At that point the chamber also votes on the bill in its entirety and sends it back to the committee. A final approval is by the floor on the third reading, after which the bill goes to the Federation Council (the upper chamber of parliament). Budget bills often have a fourth reading.

\textsuperscript{14}Ideally, I would like to compare constituency effects on final passage votes with those on nonfinal passage votes and, similarly, constituency effects on key votes with those on nonkey votes. However, I was unable to do so for computational reasons (the number of nonfinal passage votes and nonfinal passage votes exceeds 13,000).
Representation in Hybrid Regimes

on Mayhey’s (1991) definition of important legislation. Important legislation is identified on the basis of the assessments of political analysts, participants in the policy process, and policy experts. These include both judgments of contemporary observers and “the retrospective judgments by specialists who consider the importance of enactments in a particular policy area from a medium- and a long-term perspective” (Chaisty and Schleiter, 2005).\(^{15}\)

**Estimating the Legislator-Constituency Relationship**

The statistical model has theoretical foundations in the uni-dimensional spatial model (Enelow, 1989). I estimate the model in a Bayesian framework, using vague priors for all unknown parameters (see Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers, 2004). Bayesian estimation produces a posterior distribution that reflects the beliefs that researchers should hold after updating their prior beliefs (which here are vague and uninformative) by looking at a set of observations. I employ a hierarchical model, where at the first level I estimate the legislator ideal points of all deputies from individual voting records, as in the standard ideal point estimation methods (see Poole and Rosenthal, 1985). Simultaneously, at the second level I use the information about constituency preferences and party affiliation and estimate their effects on the ideal points of the SMD deputies. The simultaneous estimation allows for the estimation of their effects while taking into account the uncertainty about legislator ideal points (see Lewis and Linzer, 2005).\(^{16}\) While there are other ways to take into account uncertainty about ideal points, such as weighted least squares, they often entail additional methodological problems (see Lewis and Linzer, 2005).

More generally, analysis of voting records of the kind presented here poses challenges to maximum likelihood estimation because of the large number of parameters to be estimated: each legislator has an ideal point and each bill has a policy location that must be estimated (Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers, 2004).

The utility of a legislator \(i\) from voting “yea” on roll call \(j\) is:

\[
U_i Y_{ji} = -(\theta_i - Y_j)^2 + \varepsilon_{ij},
\]

where \(Y_j\) is the location of the “yea” alternative on vote \(j\) and \(\varepsilon_{ij}\) is a random shock to \(i\)’s utility on vote \(j\) for voting “yea.” Legislator \(i\) votes for the alternative that yields higher utility. Let \(y_{ij} = 1\) if \(i\) votes “yea.”

\(^{15}\)I include all readings for the key votes in the statistical analysis.

\(^{16}\)In conventional two-stage regression, legislator ideal points are estimated from roll call records at the first stage, and the effects of the covariates on ideal points are estimated at the second stage, where legislator ideal points are treated as data.
Then

\[ P[y_{ij} = 1] = P[U_i(Y_j) > U_i(N_j)] \]

\[ = P[-(\theta_i^2 - 2\theta_i Y_j + Y_j^2) + \varepsilon_{ij}^Y > -(\theta_i^2 - 2\theta_i Y_j + N_j^2) + \varepsilon_{ij}^N] \]

\[ = P \left[ \frac{\varepsilon_{ijY} - \varepsilon_{ijN}}{\sigma_i} < \frac{2(Y_j - N_j)}{\sigma_j} \left( \theta_i - \frac{Y_j + N_j}{2} \right) \right]. \]

The error term \( \varepsilon_{ij}^K \) captures randomness in legislative behavior that could arise from the inability to be informed about the position of the alternatives. The \( \varepsilon_{ijY} \) and \( \varepsilon_{ijN} \) are independent and identically distributed Type I extreme value random variables, whose difference \( \varepsilon_{ij} \) is a logistic random variable.

Let \( k_j = \left( \gamma_j Y_j + \gamma_j N_j \right) / 2 \) and \( \alpha_j = \left( \gamma_j Y_j - \gamma_j N_j \right) / 2 \), the cut-point for vote \( j \) and the discrimination parameter. Legislators with ideal points greater than \( k_j \) will tend to vote for the bill, and legislators with ideal points less than \( k_j \) will tend to vote against the bill. If \( \theta_i = k_j \), the legislator is equally likely to vote in favor or against the bill. The second term, \( \alpha_j \) magnifies the difference between the ideal point and the cut-point. Votes with high value of \( \alpha_j \) discriminate well between legislators with ideal points above and individuals with ideal points below \( k_j \). Thus,

\[ P[y_{ij} | \alpha_j, k_j | \theta_i] = \Lambda(\alpha_j(\theta_i - k_j)). \]

In contrast to the standard methods for ideal point estimation (Poole and Rosenthal, 1985; Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers, 2004), here the ideal points of the SMD deputies \( \theta_i \) is a function of observed covariates—district and party characteristics—and a random shock. More specifically,

\[ \theta_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \times \text{district preference} + \beta_j \times \text{party}_1 + \cdots + \beta_n \times \text{party}_n + \xi_i. \]

The indicator variables for party membership account for the possibility that members of different parties could exhibit differences in their voting behavior unrelated to constituency preferences. Following the convention in the American politics literature and for greater generalizability of the findings, the roll call matrix was split for the party switchers at the time of the split.\(^{17} \)

Thus, there is more than one estimated ideal points for the party-switchers. The random shock \( \xi_i \) accounts for the possibility that legislators with the same party and constituency characteristics might vote differently due to idiosyncratic factors. The model is fit using Markov Chain Monte Carlo

\(^{17}\)In the 1996–1999 Duma, 42 SMD deputies switched their legislative party affiliation.
(MCMC), in particular Gibbs sampling. I fit the model using WinBugs (Spiegelhalter et al., 1999).\textsuperscript{18}

**Empirical Results**

The main empirical results are presented in Table 1. On key votes and final passage votes, constituency preferences have a positive and significant effect on legislator-induced preferences, even after party affiliation is controlled for. As both legislator ideal points and district ideology have a mean of zero and a standard deviation ($SD$) of one, the magnitude of the coefficient of district ideology indicates by how many $SD$s would legislator ideal points increase if we increase district ideology by one $SD$. The coefficient of constituency preferences in Model 1a, which could be conceptualized as the effect of “total” responsiveness, which encompasses the effects of both party and constituency, is positive and significant. For key votes, increasing the average district ideology by one would lead to an ideal point change of 0.24 using Measure 1 or 0.3106 for Measure 2 (Models 1a and 3a in Table 1). If we control for party affiliation, the effect of constituency ideology is more modest, but still statistically significant.

For key votes, increasing average ideology by one $SD$ increases legislator ideal points in Model 2a by 0.0796 or 0.1349 when using Measure 1 and 2, respectively. The effect of district preference is not huge, but is statistically distinguishable from zero, suggesting that, as hypothesized, constituency preferences have a significant and positive effect on legislator positioning on the major dimension of political conflict.

While to some extent constituency demands are channeled through the parties (the coefficient decreases when party membership is accounted for), the positive and statistically significant relationship between constituency preferences and induced legislator preferences suggests that there is some variation within legislative parties according to constituency preferences. To interpret the magnitude of the effect of constituency, consider the case of the deputy whose position is at the average for the Communist Party of the Russian Federation ($-0.57$). In order for her and the most “liberal” communist deputy, whose ideal point is at $-0.43$, to have identical ideal points, district ideology must change by 1.39 $SD$s (using estimates from Model 2). On key votes the party membership coefficients have positive and significant coefficients, suggesting that both the deputy groups and the parliamentary branches of parliamentary parties had distinct policy positions. The magnitude of the coefficients and the parties’ ordering along the reform dimension is consistent with their generally accepted positions. The party closest to the Communist

\textsuperscript{18}I used vague normal priors on all parameters except the $SD$, for which I used vague uniform distributions. Legislator ideal points were identified by setting their mean to zero and $SD$ to one.
**TABLE 1**

1996–1999 Duma

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Key Votes</th>
<th>Final Passage Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1a</td>
<td>Model 2a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.5179***</td>
<td>-1.5288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District</td>
<td>0.24*** (0.0474)</td>
<td>0.0796* (0.0406)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preference 1</td>
<td>Agrarian Party</td>
<td>0.4068*** (0.1408)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District</td>
<td>SMD</td>
<td>1.3281*** (0.1942)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preference 2</td>
<td>Yabloko</td>
<td>1.0452*** (0.1408)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agrarian Party</td>
<td>Russia's Regions</td>
<td>1.1826*** (0.1319)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMD</td>
<td>People's Power</td>
<td>0.6552*** (0.1319)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMD</td>
<td>Our Home is Russia</td>
<td>1.5247*** (0.1371)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMD</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
Representation in Hybrid Regimes

Party is the communist ally, the Agrarian Party, and the party furthest to the right is the liberal Yabloko. On final passage votes the relationship between constituency preferences and legislative positioning is also positive and significant. An increase in district “liberalness” by one is associated with an increase of 0.2135 in legislator ideal points when using Measure 1 (Model 1b) or 0.2281 when using Measure 2 (Model 3b). Similarly to the relationship on final passage votes, all party dummy variables have a positive and significant coefficient. After controlling for party membership, the effect of constituency is still statistically significant. An increase in district liberalism by one is associated with a 0.0759 increase in legislator ideal points when using Measure 1 (Model 2b) or 0.1174 when using Measure 2 (Model 4b).

Robustness Checks

I subject my results to a number of robustness checks (presented in the Online Appendix). In Models 6a, 6b, 7a, 11a, 11b, 12a, and 12b (see Tables 3 and 4 in the Online Appendix), I investigate whether electoral as opposed to legislative party affiliation matters for legislative responsiveness. I employ two different measures of electoral party affiliation. In models 6a, 6b, 11a, and 11b, I consider party affiliation at the electoral stage. In Models 7a, 7b, 12a, and 12b, I consider electoral party affiliation only if it was preserved in the legislature. I find that electoral party affiliation does not have a significant explanatory power unless it was maintained in the legislature. The coefficients of the dummy variables for electoral party affiliation are insignificant. However, the coefficients for electoral party affiliation that was maintained in the legislature are statistically significant, albeit slightly smaller than those for legislative party affiliation (see Tables 3 and 4 in the Online Appendix). Most importantly, these alternative measures of party affiliation do not affect the substantive or significant effects of district preference on legislative ideal points. In Models 8a, 8b, 13a, and 13b (Tables 3 and 4) I examine whether responsiveness to district preferences is conditional on party membership. I find that deputies from all parties except for Yabloko (in all models) and APR (in Models 8b and 13a) were responsive to district preferences (an exception is the insignificant coefficient for OHR in Model 8a). It is interesting that deputies from purely legislative parties such as Russia’s Regions were responsive to their districts, which implies that electoral parties are not necessary for a strong legislator-constituency connection. I investigate whether the deputies who switched their legislative affiliation were more responsive to district preferences. Representatives could join parties with more resources in order to improve their electoral prospects (see Aldrich, 1995; Aldrich and Bianco, 1992) or, alternatively, parties with platforms more in line with their personal policy preferences. The relationship between party switching,

19 The omitted category here is the Communist Party, the party furthest to the left, and for this reason all party coefficients are positive.
responsiveness to constituency, and their effects on legislative positioning is not straightforward. If legislators are primarily officeseeking and if voters punish legislators from deviating from their electoral commitments, we might expect the switchers to be more responsive to district preferences in order to compensate for this. On the other hand, if legislators are mostly policy-motivated, we should expect them to join parties whose platforms are most similar to their own ideology, without necessarily being more responsive to district preferences. My results are more consistent with the second proposition. I find that the nonswitchers are responsive to district preferences (with the exception of Model 10b), while the switchers are not (see Model 5a, 5b, 10a, and 10b in Tables 3 and 4). To facilitate the interpretation of the results, conditional coefficients are presented in Table 6. The majority of the party switchers ran as independents or candidates of small parties that did not obtain legislative representation. A possible explanation for the lack of responsiveness of the party switchers is their strong personal reputation, which made it unnecessary to cater to the policy preferences of local voters (even though they still might have tried to win their support through the distribution of pork). I also compare the strength of party effects (see Models 9a, 9b, 14a, and 14b in Tables 3 and 4 in the Online Appendix) by including covariates, namely, party dummy variables, in the estimation of the ideal points of the PR deputies.\(^{20}\) I find that there are no statistically significant differences in party effects between SMD and PR deputies from Yabloko and OHR (the 95 percent confidence intervals of the dummy variables of the party dummies for SMD and those for PR deputies overlap).\(^{21}\) This lack of difference in party effects between SMD and PR deputies is in line with Remington and Smith (1995) and Haspel et al. (1998). Note that the absence of a difference is not inconsistent with the local responsiveness we identified. At least for some legislative parties, strong party effects do not have to be at the expense of local responsiveness. For instance, Yabloko deputies could overall be the most liberal, and yet, there could be variation within the party according to district preferences, with deputies from pro-reform districts more likely to support pro-reform bills.

Deputies elected by large electoral margins are less dependent on party resources; their willingness to shirk party demands may allow them to vote in line with district preferences. On the other hand, the size of their electoral majority might make them less susceptible to constituency pressures if they have a strong personal reputation. Margin is the difference between the percentage vote share of the largest and the second-largest vote-getter. I find support for the first proposition (see Table 5). Due to the presence of interaction terms

\(^{20}\)In this model, both SMD and PR legislator ideal points are estimated with covariates; however, in the case of the SMD deputies, there is an additional covariate (district preference).

\(^{21}\)Note that we can only compare the PR and SMD deputies from Yabloko and OHR because only those two parties and the CPRF have a sufficient number of both PR and SMD deputies; however, the CPRF is the baseline category. Note also that the equation for the PR deputies was estimated without a constant term in order to identify the model.
and the conditionality of estimates, it is difficult to interpret the effects of constituency based on the raw coefficients. To facilitate the interpretation, I present conditional coefficients in Table 7. District ideology has a positive and significant coefficient for deputies with electoral margin one $SD$ above the average of 13.76 (23.76) in almost all models (Models 15a, 15b, and 16a), but not for those with electoral margin one $SD$ below the average electoral margin (3.76) or at the mean (with the exception of Model 16a).

**Broader Implications**

Here, I integrate for the first time individual-level survey data on citizen attitudes to economic reform and legislative voting records from the 1996 to 1999 Duma. Estimating legislator ideal points as a function of district preferences and party membership, I find that legislators were responsive on votes their constituents could potentially monitor, even after controlling for party membership. While the covariation between legislator revealed preferences and district preferences is not as strong as in established democracies such as the United States, it is statistically significant even after controlling for party membership.

My results provide evidence of a particular kind of representation neglected in most previous studies: I show that despite legislative susceptibility to special interests and the tendency to provide pork, which impeded the passage of important reform legislation, legislators in the 1996–1999 Duma were responsive to the ideological preferences of their constituents. More broadly, the findings demonstrate that the desire for reelection can contribute to the emergence of individual accountability and legislative responsiveness in a “partially democratic” (Diamond, 2002) system like Russia in the 1990s. The existence of legislative responsiveness in the Russian unstable party system characterized by volatile parties (Brader and Tucker, 2001; White et al., 1997) and generally weak party attachments (Colton, 2000; Colton and McFaul, 2003) provides evidence in support of the argument that a strong legislator-constituency relationship can develop in the absence of a strong party system.

This study has implications for the consequences of mixed electoral systems in young democracies. Despite the popularity of mixed systems, the effects of the divided electoral mandate on legislative voting behavior has received insufficient scholarly attention, even in countries where the mixed system is old enough, such as Germany. Most of the few previous studies that study this issue focus on representational orientations rather than on voting behavior (Scholl, 1986; Lancaster and Patterson, 1995; Montgomery, 1995; Strattman and Baur, 2002). My findings demonstrate that constituency preferences were reflected in legislative voting behavior on important legislation.

---

22 Mixed electoral systems were adopted in Hungary, Lithuania, Macedonia, Georgia, Ukraine, Armenia, Albania, Russia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan. Bulgaria and Croatia adopted mixed-member systems before replacing them with PR systems.
SMD deputies in the Russian Duma behaved similarly to representatives in a “pure” SMD system, despite countervailing pressures. The findings are at least partially consistent with the expectations of electoral engineers who advocated the introduction of mixed systems as the “best of both worlds,” (Shugart and Wattenberg, 2001) systems that would encourage the development of cohesive national parties through the PR component and simultaneously contribute to the development of local responsiveness through the SMD component.

The use of roll call data and the estimation of ideal points, infrequent in the context of the Russian Duma, provides a number of insights. First, it summarizes in an informative way a tremendous amount of information (thousands of recorded votes of the deliberative body) about legislators, based on a theoretically driven statistical model. The distribution of ideal points reveals to what extent legislative voting alignments reflect party affiliation or district preferences. Unlike standard ideal point estimation methods (Poole and Rosenthal, 1985:2001), for which the estimation of a large number of parameters presents a challenge, Bayesian ideal point estimation can easily be extended to handle more complex specifications. The Bayesian hierarchical model allows us to directly estimate the effect of party and constituency on legislative positions, while taking into account the uncertainty about legislative ideal points.  

REFERENCES


The Bayesian approach we employ models ideal points as stochastic functions of district and personal characteristics. This means that increasing the number of legislators does not increase the number of parameters to be estimated as in the standard techniques; it merely adds more data to be used in the estimation of the effects of the covariates on legislative ideal points.


Supporting Information

Additional Supporting Information may be found in the online version of this article at the publisher’s web site:

Table 2: Party Rankings on the Reform Dimension
Table 3: 1996–1999 Duma
Table 4: 1996–1999 Duma
Table 5: 1996–1999 Duma
Table 6: Conditional coefficient of district ideology at different values of Switcher (standard errors in parenthesis)
Table 7: Conditional coefficient of district ideology at different levels of Margin (standard errors in parenthesis)